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I. INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to familiarity with cutting-edge technology, attorneys are a 
diverse group. Some attorneys are troubled by the use of new technologies and 
try to avoid it.1 At the same time, many attorneys not only embrace but also 
 
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2014; B.A., University of California, Davis, 
2011. Many thanks to Mark Freeman, Andrew Hsieh, Chris Blau, Danielle Lenth, Professor Fred Galves, and 
the members and editors of the McGeorge Law Review for assistance in writing this Comment. 
1. See, e.g., J.D. as I.T., THE NAMBY PAMBY (May 24, 2012), http://thenambypambyblog.com/2012/ 
05/24/j-d-as-i-t/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  Popular blogger and attorney, “The Namby Pamby,” 
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enthusiastically support new technologies that benefit the practice of law.2 
Beginning in the mid-2000s, attorneys following the budding trends of new 
computing technology began to notice a gap between what was merely best 
practices for safekeeping of data and what was ethically required.3 Cloud 
computing, which involves computing “services . . . controlled by third-parties 
and access[ed] over the Internet,” was one emerging technology that widened this 
gap.4 
Although it was not the first new technology to do so, cloud computing 
raised numerous ethical issues when the legal community began to explore its 
possibilities.5 Significantly, the use of cloud computing raised issues with the 
attorney’s duty of confidentiality due to its defining characteristics.6 Attorneys 
faced uncertainty over the ethical use of cloud computing because of the lack of 
practical guidance available.7 In response to this issue and others, the American 
Bar Association established the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 (“the 
Commission”), which, after several draft proposals, developed a new round of 
amendments to the Model Rules.8 The most significant amendment relating to 
cloud computing was Model Rule 1.6(c), which added an affirmative prevention 
requirement to the duty of client confidentiality.9 
 
has written about this from personal experience. On one occasion, he documented a phone call with a partner at 
his firm: 
Partner: What are you doing? 
Me: Writing a brief. Can I help you with something? 
Partner: I need you to help me get something out of the trashcan. 
Me: Uh . . . Your actual trashcan or the one on your computer screen. 
Partner: Uh . . . the computer one. 
Me: I’ll be right there. Id. 
2. See Richard M. Goehler et al., Technology Traps: Ethical Considerations for Litigators in a 24/7 
Online World, 36 LITIGATION 34 (2010) (“Many attorneys believe that to compete in the legal marketplace, they 
must master the new ways in which individuals use technology to communicate.”). 
3. ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, ISSUES PAPER CONCERNING CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY AND 
LAWYERS USE OF TECHNOLOGY 2 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
2011_build/ethics_2020/clientconfidentiality_issuespaper.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION ISSUES PAPER] (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
4. Id. 
5. See, e.g., ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) (determining 
attorneys may transmit confidential information by unencrypted email without violating the Model Rules). 
6. See infra Part III (discussing the development of Model Rule 1.6(c)). 
7. Since the obligations under the Model Rules did not address it, many state bar associations attempted 
to issue their own opinions on the use of cloud computing. See, e.g., Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. Legal Ethics & 
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2011-200 (2011) (determining Pennsylvania ethical obligations for attorneys 
using cloud computing and confidentiality). 
8. ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, RESOLUTION TO HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4–5 (2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120508_ethics_20_20_final_resolution_an
d_report_technology_and_confidentiality_posting.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION RESOLUTION] (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
9. Id. 
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This Comment approaches Model Rule 1.6(c) from the perspective of an 
attorney using cloud computing services and argues that, while the rule’s current 
iteration succeeds as a general rule clarifying the existence of an affirmative 
safeguard obligation, it fails to provide real instruction and guidance to attorneys 
in practice who are seeking to meet their ethical obligations. Part II of this 
Comment evaluates cloud computing services and concludes that, despite the 
risks, attorneys benefit greatly from incorporating cloud computing into their 
practices as long as they meet their ethical duties. Part III then explains the duty 
of client confidentiality and the need for a rule addressing new technology uses. 
Part IV analyzes the goals of Model Rule 1.6(c) as both a practical guide and as 
an ethical clarification to determine whether it achieves its original purposes. 
Next, this Comment argues that the rule, as interpreted by the factors in its 
official comment, fails to adequately meet its goals. Finally, it proposes a 
solution to address the identified shortcomings. 
II. CLOUD COMPUTING AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
Attorneys, like other professionals, incorporate new technology into their 
practices when it serves their needs. However, due to the unique responsibilities 
of the legal profession,10 attorneys must evaluate any technology’s impact on 
their ethical obligations before jumping on the bandwagon.11 
A. Explanation of Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing refers “to services that are controlled by third-parties and 
accessed over the Internet.”12 Unlike traditional forms of computing, which 
 
10. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2012) (serving as the model for most 
jurisdiction’s ethics rules). 
11. Small business owners that do not face the same ethical obligations as attorneys have less to worry 
about when adopting cloud computing services. Cf. Marcy Hoffman, Is the Cloud Secure Enough for Your 
Small Business?, INFOSTREET’S SMALL BUSINESS BLOG (Aug. 22, 2012), http://smallbusinessblog. 
infostreet.com/2012/08/is-the-cloud-secure-enough-for-your-small-business/ (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (discussing security needs for small business, which can differ from a law practice); Jesse Lipson, Is 
Your Data Safe in the Cloud?, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2011, 1:56 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/ 
2011/03/16/is-your-data-safe-in-the-cloud/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (claiming that safety 
concerns are a result of “your brain . . . conflating control with safety”). 
12. COMMISSION ISSUES PAPER, supra note 3, at 1. This simple and likely flawed definition can be 
compared with the more detailed definition given by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), a division of the US Department of Commerce, which declares: “Cloud computing is a model for 
enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources . . . that 
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” 
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-146, CLOUD COMPUTING SYNOPSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 2-1 (2012), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-146/sp800-146.pdf 
[hereinafter NIST] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The five essential characteristics of a cloud 
computing service are identified by the NIST as on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource 
pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured service. Id. 
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require the user to install software or store data locally, cloud computing 
companies allow the user to access services and data through any compatible 
Internet connected device.13 Many forms of cloud computing exist, but the most 
common types that attorneys will encounter are online storage and backup,14 web-
based email,15 and software-as-a-service, which “replace[s] costly licensed 
software with purportedly less expensive access to software on an as needed 
basis.”16 In addition to general use services, some cloud software suites are made 
specifically for law practice management.17 These low-cost, web-based solutions 
have even made it possible for attorneys to operate “virtual law offices,” which 
gives attorneys the ability to practice without a traditional office.18 
B. Risks for Attorneys 
All users of cloud computing services encounter a host of risks, but due to 
heightened ethical responsibilities in the legal profession, attorneys face 
potentially greater ones.19 The ABA Commission outlined a list of risks related 
specifically to the attorney’s duty of confidentiality when using cloud computing 
services.20 These risks focus on the fear of digital theft and hacking, loss of data, 
and inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information.21 Commentators have also 
found a number of risks associated with the lack of control over the software or 
data when using cloud computing.22 
The Commission acknowledged that theft of information can occur because 
of malicious, intentional security breaches.23 Hackers find little difference 
 
13. NIST, supra note 12, at 2-1, 2-2.  
14. Storage and backup includes popular services such as Dropbox (http://dropbox.com), Mozy 
(http://mozy.com), and Carbonite (http://carbonite.com). Online storage functions as a separate drive that allows 
for easy access, while online backup protects more in the event of data loss.  
15. Mark Brownlow, Email and Webmail Statistics, EMAIL MARKETING REPORTS (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.email-marketing-reports.com/metrics/email-statistics.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
The three main providers of web-based email (Microsoft’s Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail, and Gmail) total well over 
one billion users. Id.  
16. Roland L. Trope & Sarah Jane Hughes, Red Skies in the Morning—Professional Ethics at the Dawn of 
Cloud Computing, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV 111, 169 (2011). 
17. Clio, for example, provides cloud-based calendaring, time tracking, note-taking, document 
management, trust accounting, managing retainers, and billing all within the same service. CLIO, http://www. 
goclio.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
18. In a 2011 non-binding formal opinion, the California State Bar acknowledged this new trend and 
concluded that virtual law office practitioners have no “greater or different [ethical] duties” than those 
practicing in a traditional law office. Cal. State Bar Comm’n Prof’l Responsibility, Ethics Op. 2010-0003 
(2010). 
19. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2012) (serving as the model for ethics rules of 
most states). 
20. COMMISSION ISSUES PAPER, supra note 3, at 2. 
21. Id. 
22. Trope & Hughes, supra note 16. 
23. COMMISSION ISSUES PAPER, supra note 3, at 2. 
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between cloud and non-cloud services and will attempt to break into anything 
worthwhile.24 For example, technology journalist Mat Honan lost his entire 
digital life due to a flaw in the information used to verify identity across 
services.25 In another case, electronics manufacturer Sony faced a large-scale 
attack when hackers utilized Amazon’s cloud-based servers as weapons to shut 
down the Japanese company’s online services.26 Although some companies hold 
a reputation for optimal digital security,27 there will always be a risk associated 
with malicious and intentional data disclosure.28 
Attorneys should be aware of the many other risks involved with using cloud 
computing services. Beyond issues of outsiders breaking in, risks can arise from 
user error or accidental disclosure of information by the provider.29 These risks 
include decreased control over and decreased knowledge of the software and its 
potential instabilities,30 the security features used to protect the information,31 the 
existence of data breaches,32 and the location of the storage.33 Further, there are 
 
24. Kevin Fogarty, The Biggest Cloud Computing Security Risk Is Impossible to Eliminate, NETWORK 
COMPUTING (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.networkcomputing.com/security/the-biggest-cloud-computing-security-
ris/240005337 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Except for the potential booty (money, data or notoriety), 
cloud and non-cloud services look pretty much the same to criminals trying to crack them open.”). 
25. See Mat Honan, How Apple and Amazon Security Flaws Led to My Epic Hacking, WIRED (Aug. 6, 
2012, 8:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/ (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). Mat Honan summarizes how the hacking occurred:  
In short, the very four digits that Amazon considers unimportant enough to display in the clear on 
the web are precisely the same ones that Apple considers secure enough to perform identity 
verification. The disconnect exposes flaws in data management policies endemic to the entire 
technology industry, and points to a looming nightmare as we enter the era of cloud computing and 
connected devices. Id. 
26. Joseph Galante, Olga Kharif & Pavel Alpeyev, Sony Network Breach Shows Amazon Cloud’s Appeal 
for Hackers, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 16, 2011, 1:45 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-15/sony-
attack-shows-amazon-s-cloud-service-lures-hackers-at-pennies-an-hour.html (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
27. E-discovery company Catalyst, for example, has been vetted by and hosted repositories for “banks, 
major software companies, insurers and the U.S. government for sensitive terrorist materials.” Why Catalyst for 
Complex E-Discovery, CATALYST, http://www.catalystsecure.com/about/why-catalyst/key-benefits.html (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
28. See, e.g., Natasha Lennard, Anonymous Hacks U.S. Sentencing Commission Website for Aaron 
Swartz, SALON (Jan. 28, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/01/28/anonymous_hacks_doj_ 
website_for_aaron_swartz/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining the motivation for multiple 
successful attempts at hacking of the US Sentencing Commission website during January 2013). 
29. See generally Trope & Hughes, supra note 16 (discussing the risks of cloud computing for attorneys 
in-depth); Audrey Watters, Google’s Internal Security Breach Raises Questions About Trust and the Cloud, 
READWRITEWEB (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.readwriteweb.com/cloud/2010/09/googles-internal-security-brea 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing an internal security breach at Google by an employee). But 
see Larry Walsh, Red Herrings in Cloud Computing, CHANNELNOMICS (Sept. 17, 2010), http:// 
channelnomics.com/2010/09/17/red-herrings-in-cloud-computing/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(rebutting the safety concerns over Google’s cloud services). 
30. Trope & Hughes, supra note 16, at 175. Diminished control can be especially problematic if there are 
crashes or outages that could leave an attorney without access to his or her data. Id. 
31. Id. at 215–16. 
32. Id. at 218–19. 
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also risks of government surveillance or seizure.34 These risks are inherent when 
allowing someone else to have complete control over one’s data. In fact, Steve 
Wozniak, co-founder of Apple, warns that the over-reliance on cloud services is 
“going to be horrendous” and predicts “a lot of horrible problems” as a result of 
this lack of control.35 If a server goes down on the provider’s side, for example, 
attorneys can lose access to client information and may be unable to retrieve it.36 
C. Benefits for Attorneys 
Cloud computing does bear significant risks; however, this is true for all 
technologies. While a candid review of cloud computing discloses a list of 
potential issues, there are significant benefits for attorneys. Attorneys benefit 
from cloud computing because these services grant greater accessibility to 
information, provide the same or better services as locally stored data at lower 
cost, and improve efficiency by simplifying the user experience with easy web-
based access.37 
First, attorneys have more access to their data when using cloud computing 
services because it can be made easily available from many locations and on 
many devices.38 Attorneys can utilize the “linkage and integration of the 
numerous computing devices” to connect with their work more quickly and 
easily.39 This saves time and brings costs down by streamlining attorneys’ access 
to their information. 
Second, cloud computing services are generally much cheaper than 
traditional options because sharing physical computing resources, including 
networking and storage, helps to distribute expenses to keep costs down over a 
 
33. Id. at 224–26. 
34. Id. at 230–33. This area has become particularly fertile due to recent revelations about the extent of 
the National Security Agency’s surveillance programs. See NSA Spying on Americans, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/nsa-spying (last visited March 16, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (collecting revelations and updates on the issue); see also Letter from James R. Silkenat, President, 
American Bar Association, to General Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency (February 20, 
2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (expressing concerns over the surveillance of American 
lawyers' confidential communications with overseas clients). 
35. Shane Richmond, Apple Founder Warns of ‘Horrendous’ Cloud Computing Risks, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 
6, 2012, 3:11 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple/9456281/Apple-founder-warns-of-horrendous-
cloud-computing-risks.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
36. This issue has caused some attorneys to question the benefits of cloud storage. One attorney wrote on 
his blog that “[p]erhaps [the] old guy who never got a computer and gets his secretary to print all his emails for 
him to read has it right after all.” Phillip W. Thomas, Amazon Crash Has Me Re-thinking the Cloud, MS LITIG. 
REV. AND COMMENTARY (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.mslitigationreview.com/2012/10/articles/general-
1/amazon-crash-has-me-rethinking-the-cloud/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
37. See Shellie Stephens, Going Google: Your Practice, The Cloud, and the ABA Commission on Ethics 
20/20, 2011 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 237, 238–39 (2011) (discussing benefits of cloud computing for 
lawyers). 
38. Trope & Hughes, supra note 16, at 168. 
39. Id. 
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larger user base.40 Attorneys can reduce startup and maintenance costs by using 
cloud services instead of utilizing more expensive traditional hardware and 
software.41 Attorneys also save money from the reduced need for IT personnel, as 
there is less to administer on the user’s end.42 
Finally, attorneys benefit from the efficiency of cloud computing services. 
Cloud services often present a seamless user interface, keeping most technical 
aspects hidden.43 When there is a problem, the service provider can find a 
solution without the need for the user to download and install updates locally.44 
Because data and programs are stored off-site, attorneys do not risk losing 
important information to accidents like computer malfunction, fire, or other 
property damage at their offices.45 Attorneys seeking to optimize their practices 
by “going paperless” also benefit vastly from the gains of cloud services over 
using an in house system, especially for those attorneys without vast resources to 
spend on overhead costs.46 
D. Evaluation of Cloud Computing Use 
Although some hold doubts about its use, cloud computing is generally 
secure enough for attorneys to use without worrying that the sky is falling.47 This 
is especially true when compared to the alternatives of physical documents or 
locally stored electronic data.48 A client file that exists in physical form or 
electronically on a local drive could be destroyed, stolen, or misplaced in the 
 
40. Shannon Brown, Navigating the Fog of Cloud Computing, 33 PA. LAW. 19 (2011). 
41. At the time of this Comment, Google offers 15 GB of storage for free to all users. Storage Plan 
Pricing, GOOGLE.COM, https://support.google.com/drive/answer/2375123?hl=en&p=mktg_pricing (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Shawn L. Holahan, Silver Lining in That Cloud, 
60 LA. B.J. 320 (2013) (“In essence, law firms rent software through the cloud instead of purchasing it. . . .”). 
42. Trope & Hughes, supra note 16, at 166 (“Potential clients are being encouraged to scrap their in-
house servers and save on the associated costs by outsourcing their data storage and processing to off-premises 
server farms . . . .”). 
43. The popular attorney cloud service, Clio, is a good example of a service that presents the end user 
with a simple, intuitive format. CLIO, http://www.goclio.com/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
44. NIST, supra note 12, at 2-1, 2-2. 
45. It is possible that these accidents could take place at the cloud server location; however, because 
cloud service providers are in the business of holding data, it is reasonable to find that data stored by 
professionals is less susceptible to such accidents than that stored by an end-user. See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 
11 (“Cloud software companies, knowing the implications of a crash on their business’ bottom line, invest 
significant resources into insuring that such a disaster never occurs. Cloud computing companies can invest far 
more resources in data backup and security than your business can.”).  
46. Laura A. Calloway, How to Go Paperless, 39 LAW PRACTICE 12 (2003). 
47. Cf. Kenneth L. Bostick, Comment, Pie in the Sky: Cloud Computing Brings an End to the 
Professionalism Paradigm in the Practice of Law, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1375, 1414–15 (2012) (arguing that cloud 
computing “challenge[s the] ideology of the practice of law as an autonomous profession” and promotes a 
“business of law” mentality). 
48. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 11 (comparing the full-time resources of a cloud computing company 
to “the levels of protection that [a] part-time IT person provides”). 
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same way that a file stored on a third-party cloud server could.49 Further, 
information stored on an internet-connected local server or personal computer is 
vulnerable to attack or error even with safeguards in place; yet with cloud 
services, the company is likely to monitor and employ state-of-the-art protections 
as their business depends on providing as safe and high-quality a service as is 
practicable.50 As one commentator stated, the fear of using cloud computing is the 
“same fallacy [that] causes some people to be afraid of flying on an airplane.”51 
Since data stored in an encrypted form on remote servers is at least as secure as 
more traditional electronic means of storing client information, attorneys should 
generally welcome cloud computing as a significant benefit to their practices. 
Yet acknowledging that cloud computing is generally safe for use is only the 
first step. Attorneys must be fully aware of the ethical obligations that are 
implicated before signing up. Inherently, users of cloud services must accept the 
fact that another is in control of the user’s data and that the user has less 
knowledge of the services’ operations when compared with traditional, in-house 
solutions.52 Attorneys implicate the duty of confidentiality when others have 
access to or control over sensitive client information because the attorney is 
ultimately responsible for ensuring that confidentiality is maintained.53 Thus, 
attorneys ought to understand their responsibilities under the duty of 
confidentiality before they utilize a tool that could potentially lead to a breach.54 
III. THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND MODEL RULE 1.6(C) 
Attorneys are governed by specific ethical rules, and while these rules differ 
depending on the jurisdiction, the duty of confidentiality is a bedrock doctrine 
across the profession. It is not always clear, however, how changes to technology 
impact this ethical obligation. 
 
49. See COMMISSION ISSUES PAPER, supra note 3, at 2 (“The Commission’s efforts have been guided by 
the reality that information, whether in electronic or physical form, is susceptible to theft, loss, or inadvertent 
disclosure.”). 
50. Clio, for instance, boasts “security and privacy of your data are our top priority” and presents 
information about its encryption, privacy policy, and daily auditing, which “help[s] ensure your data is 
protected from security vulnerabilities and other online threats.” Security, CLIO, http://app.goclio.com/security 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
51. Lipson, supra note 11. 
52. See Richmond, supra note 35 (“I say the more we transfer everything onto the web, onto the cloud, 
the less we’re going to have control over it.”) 
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012). 
54. Of course, cloud computing is not unique to confidentiality issues. For purposes of this Comment, 
however, the discussion is limited.  
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A. Ethical Conduct Under the Model Rules 
Attorneys are subject to many rules that govern professional ethics.55 The 
ABA publishes the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to provide “leadership 
in legal ethics and professional responsibility through the adoption of 
professional standards that serve as models of the regulatory law governing the 
legal profession.”56 Like the Model Penal Code for criminal law,57 the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct are not binding unless enacted by jurisdictions 
with enforcement power.58 Excluding California, all jurisdictions in the United 
States follow some form of the Model Rules.59 
Whether or not the Model Rules are adopted directly, all forms of ethics rules 
have distinctly shaped how attorneys are expected to practice. Violations of these 
rules can result in disciplinary consequences that range from additional ethics 
training to disbarment.60 Each state bar has some form of disciplinary branch to 
address these violations.61 And although the Model Rules are not meant as a basis 
for civil liability,62 courts have admitted violations as evidence of professional 
malpractice in private causes of action.63 
B. The Duty of Confidentiality 
Model Rule 1.6(a) lays out the attorney’s ethical duty of confidentiality:64 
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is 
 
55. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2012). 
56. Id. at Preface. 
57. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE (1962). 
58. These jurisdictions include all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands.  
Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_ 
professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2013) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
59. Id. 
60. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. cmt. 19 (2012). 
61. Directory of Lawyer Disciplinary Agencies 2011–12, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/regulation/directory.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2014) (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review).  
62. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 20 (2012). 
63. See Gena L. Sluga & Douglas L. Christian, Playing by the Rules: Violations of Ethics Rules as 
Evidence of Legal Malpractice, 51 FED’N DEF. AND CORP. COUNS. Q., 6 (2001), available at http://www.the 
federation.org/documents/sluga.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“T]he overwhelming majority 
hold that evidence of an ethics violation is admissible in a malpractice action.”). 
64. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2012). 
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impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the 
disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).65 
Derived from agency law,66 the duty of confidentiality is an integral part of 
the legal profession and is needed for effective client representation.67 For 
example, without the duty of confidentiality criminal defense lawyers would be 
subject to constant government discovery threats and be unable to carry out the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.68 While the duty of confidentiality is 
clear in theory, attorneys face difficulty in practice. 
The duty of confidentiality has been modified over time to accommodate 
changing societal expectations for the roles of attorneys. Model Rule 1.6(b) 
provides some exceptions to confidentiality by authorizing a limited list of 
permissible disclosures.69 For example, an attorney may disclose otherwise 
confidential information where the attorney reasonably believes disclosure will 
prevent death or substantial bodily harm;70 prevent, mitigate, or rectify a client 
commission of fraud that damages financial or property interest of another;71 or in 
order to comply with a court order.72 In the early 2000s, the ABA added the 
exception for client fraud largely in response to the Enron scandal.73 By 
amending the duty, the ABA showed that the obligations under confidentiality 
have shifted over time to address new issues. 
Often considered alongside confidentiality, attorney-client privilege74 and 
attorney work product75 are important information protections in legal practice. 
Although similar in some respects, there are substantial differences in origin and 
scope between these concepts.76 In the information age, attorneys have faced 
 
65. Id. 
66. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 227 (2011). 
67. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2002) (“A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer 
relationship is that . . . the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation.”). In reference to 
the protections of confidential communications between lawyer and client, Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and 
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The 
privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or 
advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.  
Upjohn Co. v. United States., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
69. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2011). 
70. Id. R. 1.6(b)(1). 
71. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2), (3). 
72. Id. R. 1.6(b)(6). 
73. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 66, at 225 (“After the bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation 
and other scandals . . . the ABA House of Delegates adopted significant amendments to Rule 1.6 . . . .”). 
74. FED. R. EVID. 501 (2011). 
75. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26(b)(3) (2011). 
76. See MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2012) (explaining that confidentiality applies 
beyond evidentiary and discovery circumstances); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 66, at 227 
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difficulties resolving issues for all three of these protections.77 However, 
confidentiality stands out as unique as it is an ethical rule, as opposed to a law, 
and is a product of professional self-regulation.78 
C. Model Rule 1.6(c) 
In 2010, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 sent an open letter to legal 
professionals and sought comments “to determine what guidance to offer to 
lawyers who want[ed] to ensure that their use of technology complies with their 
ethical obligations to protect clients’ confidential information.”79 The 
Commission specifically identified the impact of cloud computing on 
confidential client information80 and had the goal of “[offering] recommendations 
and proposals regarding how lawyers should address [the risks of inadvertent 
disclosure].”81  As a result, the Commission eventually proposed paragraph (c) as 
an addition to Model Rule 1.6.82 Model Rule 1.6(c) provides that: 
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or 
unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information 
relating to the representation of a client.83 
Before adopting 1.6(c), the Model Rules merely provided reference to the 
potential issue of inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure in a comment to Model 
Rule 1.6.84 The Commission based this rule in part on the previous iterations of 
Comments 16 and 17 from the 2002 edition of the Model Rules.85 Comment 17 
stated that a lawyer “must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information 
 
(explaining that confidentiality is often considered wider but weaker than evidentiary privilege). 
77. See, e.g., John A. Wetenkamp, Note, The Impact of E-Mail on Attorney Practice and Ethics, 34 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 135, 136–37 (2002) (discussing attorney use of email and confidentiality); see generally 
Adjoa Linzy, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Discovery of Electronically-Stored Information, 2011 DUKE L. 
& TECH. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing complications with privilege and e-discovery). 
78. The Model Rules are a set of ethical rules written by attorneys to govern the conduct of attorneys as 
opposed to laws created by a legislature. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2012) (serving as 
the model for most states ethics rules); Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012) 
(supporting the proposition). 
79. Letter from ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 Working Group on the Implications of New Technologies, 
to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Associations, Law Schools, Individuals, and Entities (Sept. 20, 2010), at 1 
[hereinafter Letter from Commission] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 2. 
82. COMMISSION RESOLUTION, supra note 8, at 4. 
83. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2012). 
84. Id.1.6 cmt. 17 (2002) (“When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the 
representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming 
into the hands of unintended recipients.”). 
85. Id. R. 1.6 cmts. 16, 17. 
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from coming into the hands of unintended recipients.”86 Model Rule 1.6(a) uses 
the language “shall not,”87 and Model Rule 1.6(b) uses the language “may.”88 
Model Rule 1.6(c) differs by requiring the attorney to take affirmative steps to 
prevent a problem.89 Because the rule requires taking action, rather than merely 
prohibiting particular action, it is essential for the attorney to understand what he 
or she must actually do. 
The Commission provided a comment to Model Rule 1.6(c) (“Comment 
18”)90 intended to offer guidance to attorneys.91 The comment provides: 
Paragraph (c) requires a lawyer to act competently to safeguard 
information relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized 
access by third parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure 
by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation 
of the client or who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision. . . . The 
unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, 
information relating to the representation of a client does not constitute a 
violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to 
prevent the access or disclosure.92 
Under the comment’s guidance, attorneys can consult a non-exhaustive list of 
factors to determine what constitutes “reasonable efforts” under Model Rule 
1.6(c):93 
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the 
lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the 
 
86. Id.  
87. Id. R. 1.6(a) (2012). 
88. Id. R. 1.6(b). 
89. Id. R. 1.6(c) (“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized 
disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client.”); see also Letter 
from Charles E. McCallum, Chair, ABA Business Law Section Professional Responsibility Committee, to ABA 
Commission on Ethics 20/20 (Apr. 4, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
Model Rule 1.6 (a) and (b) deal with restrictions on a lawyer’s “revealing” information, i.e., a 
voluntary and knowing act by the lawyer. New subsection 1.6 (c) brings into the body of the Rule for 
the first time (although it is dealt with in Comments [16] and [17]) the requirement that the lawyer 
also “make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or 
unauthorized access to, information” relating to a client representation. Id. 
90. The number of this comment changed during the drafting process. For ease of understanding, all 
references to the language will be referred to as Comment 18, which is consistent with Model Rule 1.6 as of 
2012.  
91. ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO HOUSE OF DELEGATES 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120508_ethics_20_20_final_resolut
ion_and_report_technology_and_confidentiality_posting.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Commission Report] 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
92. MODEL RULE PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18 (2012). 
93. COMMISSION RESOLUTION, supra note 8, at 4–5. 
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information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not 
employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of 
implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards 
adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making 
a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use).94 
Comments to the Model Rules “do not add obligations,” so Comment 18 
functions only as “guidance for practicing in compliance” with Model Rule 
1.6(c).95 However, the comments in the Model Rules are particularly important 
because they address specific circumstances that are not covered by the general 
principles provided by the text of the rules.96 
IV. ANALYSIS OF MODEL RULE 1.6(C) 
This Part analyzes the origin and goals of Model Rule 1.6(c) and whether the 
rule will succeed as a practical guide when applied to attorney use of cloud 
computing. Next, this Part considers the intended beneficiaries of the rule. It 
concludes by proposing the ABA eliminate the factors in Comment 18 and 
replace them with a reference to standards of security as determined by experts in 
the field. 
A. The Goals of the Rule 
The Commission proposed Model Rule 1.6(c) after the legal community 
found a gap in the current ethics rules governing client confidentiality when 
using new technologies like cloud computing.97 Many state and local bar 
associations attempted to fill this gap with formal opinions;98 however, there 
remained an air of uncertainty, which prompted potentially over-the-top advice 
from some commentators.99 
 
94. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18 (2012). 
95. Id. pmbl. & scope 14. 
96. See, e.g., id. R. 1.6 cmt. 6–12. (providing additional information on the disclosure exceptions that are 
potentially adverse to client interests). Some comment scenarios are also tested in the Multistate Professional 
Responsibility Exam, which all future attorney’s must pass before admission to their respective bars. MPRE 
Subject Matter Outline (National Conference of Bar Examiners 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
97. Letter from Commission, supra note 79, at 2 (“As an initial matter, the Commission recognizes that 
there may be a gap between technology-related security measures that are ethically required and security 
measures that are merely consistent with best practices.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
98. See, e.g., State Bar of Nevada Standing Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Opinion 
No. 33, at 1 (2006) (“If the lawyer acts competently and reasonably to ensure the confidentiality of the 
information, then he or she does not violate SCR 156 simply by contracting with a third party to store 
information . . . .”); Pennsylvania Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Opinion 
2011-200 (2011); New York State Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics, Opinion 842 (2010).  
99. See Brown, supra note 40, at 22 (suggesting that attorneys should know the geographic location of 
any data centers used to store their information for jurisdictional purposes). 
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Throughout the process of drafting its proposal, the Commission fielded a 
substantial amount of commentary from legal professionals and practice 
groups.100 Many provided general support for the draft proposal text,101 while 
others criticized and suggested changes.102 Ultimately, the Commission 
recommended the ABA adopt Model Rule 1.6(c) and the accompanying 
comment103 along with “the creation of a user-friendly, continuously updated 
website containing answers to common questions.”104 
The Commission had specific goals in mind when it made its proposal. First, 
the Commission intended to clarify the attorney obligation regarding inadvertent 
and unauthorized disclosure of confidential client information.105 Attorneys have 
always had some duty to prevent disclosure of confidential client information,106 
but as attorneys have increased their use of computing technology, the waters 
have muddied regarding what must be done to protect confidentiality.107 The rule 
was born out of a need for ethical guidance and clarity in the realm of new 
technology; the Commission specifically named attorney use of cloud computing 
as driving this need.108 Since the Commission sought a rule to govern ethical—
rather than merely “best practices”—use of cloud computing,109 and since the 
ABA eventually adopted the proposal and incorporated the language into the 
Model Rules,110 the ABA has seemingly endorsed the use of cloud computing for 
 
100. See Technology Comments Chart, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/technology_working_group_comments_chart.authcheckdam.pdf 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
101. Letter from Myles V. Lynk, Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, to ABA 
Commission on Ethics 20/20 (Nov. 11, 2011); Letter from the Legal Cloud Computing Association, to Natalia 
Vera, ABA Center for Professional Responsibility (July 15, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
102. Comments on Revised Proposal on Technology and Confidentiality, Attorneys’ Liability Assurance 
Soc’y, Inc. (Nov. 30, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Comments of Robert A. Creamer on 
Ethics 20/20, Robert A. Creamer (Nov. 29, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
103. COMMISSION RESOLUTION, supra note 8, at 4–5. 
104. Letter from Jamie S. Gorelick and Michael Traynor, Co-Chairs, ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, to 
ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Associations, Law Schools, and Individuals (Dec. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111228_summary_of_ethics_20_20
_commission_actions_december_2011_final.authcheckdam.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
105. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 91, at 4. 
106. Id. (“Although this obligation is described in Comments [16 and 17 of the 2002 edition of the Model 
Rules], the Commission concluded that technology has made this duty sufficiently important that it should be 
elevated to black letter status in the form of the proposed Model Rule 1.6(c).”). 
107. See Stephens, supra note 37, at 241–43 (discussing the inadequacy of the previous test for 
“reasonable precautions” under the Model Rule comments); supra note 98 (providing various tests as  
determined by state bar associations). Although the lack of clarity as to professional ethics obligations was 
noted by many, it was up to the ABA, who composes the Model Rules, to provide guidance since the earlier 
rule proved unworkable and lacked clout. 
108. Letter from Jamie S. Gorelick and Michael Traynor, supra note 103 (“Client confidences are no 
longer kept just in file cabinets, but on laptops, smart phones, tablets, and in the cloud.”). 
109. Letter from Commission, supra note 79, at 2. 
110. See Ethics 20/20 Rule Changes Approved by ABA Delegates with Little Opposition, BLOOMBERG  
(Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.bna.com/ethics-2020-rule-n12884911245/ (announcing the approved changes, 
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the practice of law. This endorsement supports the notion that the ethical 
clarification was needed. 
Second, the Commission intended to provide guidance for attorney use of 
new technology in light of the associated confidentiality risks.111 Related to this, 
the Commission also had the implicit goal of keeping the language of the rule 
relevant and applicable. Attorneys need to understand how to practice within 
ethical rules if those rules are to have any positive effect on them. Since the 
Commission acknowledged that technology would likely outdate any specific 
language in the rule112 and intended a new rule to “reflect the realities of 21st 
century law practice,”113 the Commission necessarily intended Model Rule 1.6(c) 
to remain relevant as technology progresses and use becomes more prevalent. 
The Commission must have also intended attorneys to apply the rule in their 
daily practices. The Commission proposed an interpretive resource in the form of 
an amendment to the official comments to aid in application.114 Additionally, the 
official comment provides that “[a] client may require the lawyer to implement 
special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent 
to forgo security measures that would otherwise be required by this Rule.”115 The 
rule must be applicable to practice if it has the potential to create waivable 
security measures.116 
B. Analysis of the Rule 
The Commission had several goals when proposing Model Rule 1.6(c).117 
From the perspective of an attorney using cloud computing, the rule may not 
adequately meet all of these goals because it sacrifices applicability for 
relevancy. However, it only takes a slight rewriting of the official comment to 
overcome this problem.118 
1.  The Benefits and Challenges of Vagueness 
When reading Model Rule 1.6(c) to discover what it adds to or clarifies 
regarding attorney’s ethical obligations, one quickly realizes that the text is 
vague.119 In the context of an ethical rule, vagueness creates benefits and 
 
including Model Rule 1.6(c)). 
111. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 91, at 2. 
112. Id. at 5. 
113. Id. at 3. 
114. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18 (2012). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Supra Part IV.A.   
118. See infra Part IV.C (proposing an amendment to the interpretive comment).  
119. See MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2012). 
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challenges.  By using vague language, Model Rule 1.6(c) avoids the pitfall of 
becoming antiquated.120 Since technology use prompted the rule,121 the 
Commission wisely avoided using specific language that would quickly become 
outdated due to the relatively fast moving world of computing technology.122 
Cloud computing, which prompted the rule because of the difficulty in applying 
existing black-letter ethical obligations, will not necessarily operate or exist in its 
contemporary form as the technology continues to change. 123 Further, since the 
ABA updates the Model Rules infrequently,124 language related to specific 
technology operations would become outdated faster than the ABA would 
promulgate and implement new rules.125 
On the other hand, by using vague “reasonableness” language, attorneys have 
little guidance in applying Model Rule 1.6(c) to their practice. The standard of 
reasonableness is used generally throughout the law but has little meaning 
without interpretive guidance.126 The Commission recognized this issue and 
recommended adopting Comment 18 to assist attorneys in interpreting their 
obligation of taking “reasonable efforts.”127 The Commission also “recommended 
that the ABA create a centralized website that contains continuously updated and 
detailed information about data security.”128 Attorneys may find the guide useful, 
but it would not aid in interpreting Model Rule 1.6(c) so much as it would 
provide a resource for becoming informed about data security because it is not 
officially part of the Model Rules.129 
 
120. Id. 
121. COMMISSION ISSUES PAPER, supra note 3, at 1. 
122. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c); see generally Moore’s Law Inspires Intel Innovation, 
INTEL CORP., http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw (last visited Jan. 7, 2014) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (“Moore’s Law. . . states that the number of transistors on a chip will double 
approximately every two years.”). Moore’s Law is generally credited as the most accurate prediction as to the 
perpetually accelerating development of new technology. E.g., John O. McGinnis, Laws for Learning in an Age 
of Acceleration, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV 305, 312 (2011) (“This prediction, which has been approximately 
accurate for the last forty years, means that almost every aspect of the digital world—from computational 
calculation power to computer memory—is growing in density at a similarly exponential rate.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
123. See supra Part IV.A. 
124. The ABA last adopted a major update the Model Rules in 2003 after the Enron scandal. MODEL 
RULES PROF’L CONDUCT Preface (2013). 
125. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 91, at 5. 
126. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (“[T]he standard of conduct to which he must 
conform to avoid being negligence is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.”). Although Model 
Rule 1.0(h) defines reasonable as “denot[ing] the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer,” this 
only directs against whom “reasonable” is determined rather than how. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.0(h) (2012). Further, there are issues with assuming the phrase “reasonable efforts” necessarily uses the 
definition of the word “reasonable” in Model Rule 1.0(h). See infra Part IV.B.3. 
127. Commission Report, supra note 91, at 4–5. 
128. Id. at 5. 
129. Id. 
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2. Issues with Interpreting “Reasonable Efforts” 
The Commission acknowledged the rapid pace of technology changes but 
still chose to provide specific factors under Comment 18 “that lawyers should 
consider when determining whether their efforts are reasonable.”130 In an attempt 
to provide guidance, the Commission took a different approach to the comment 
factors than they did to the rule itself by using specific language.131 
As discussed previously, using specific language in the technology context 
hurts, rather than helps, application of law because technology advances at such a 
swift pace.132 This is especially true when the language is enshrined in the Model 
Rules because amendments to the rules are so rare.133 By the time new rules are 
adopted, specific technologies may function differently or be near extinction.134 
Regarding individual factors, Comment 18 has many interpretive struggles. 
For example, the “likelihood of disclosure” factor refers to the probability of 
disclosing client information by accident or as a result of hacking.135 On the one 
hand, both of these possibilities are inherently unpredictable and therefore elude 
accurate determinations of likelihood by an attorney. Obviously, if one could 
predict hacking, then one could take sufficient steps to prevent and thereby 
eliminate the problem, which would render the factor irrelevant to the 
determination of reasonable efforts.136 This is also true of accidents and human 
error.137 On the other hand, attorneys do not need mathematic or scientific 
accuracy in determining the content or weight of a factor. Developed by Judge 
 
130. Id. 
131. See supra Part III.C (listing the various factors). 
132. See supra note 122. 
133. The ABA last adopted a major update to the Model Rules in 2002. 
134. See, e.g., Dan Tynan, 10 Technologies That Should Be Extinct (But Aren’t), PC WORLD (Jul. 4, 
2010, 6:40 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/200325/10_technologies_that_should_be_extinct.html (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (“These screechy, annoying gadgets [fax machines] continue to attract 
realtors, lawyers, insurance companies, and others nervous about the authenticity of signed documents without 
an ink-based John or Jane Hancock on them.”). 
135. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18 (2012). 
136. The FBI provides information regarding online scams and virus warnings as well as its 
recommendations for prevention; however, outside of general safety tips, specific information regarding 
instances of hacking only comes after the fact. New E-Scams & Warnings, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/scams-
safety/e-scams (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Letter from 
Charles E. McCallum, Chair, ABA Business Law Section Professional Responsibility Committee, to ABA 
Commission on Ethics 20/20 (Apr. 4, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“As to hacking, it 
appears that even very large and well funded governmental entities and large corporations, in each case with 
large and expert staffs, access to highly capable consultants, and ability to invest in expensive and sophisticated 
data security systems, are vulnerable to hacking.”). 
137. While it may be theoretically true that human error could be predicted, these theories are still in early 
stages of development. See generally Early Warning System, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 26, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/11088585 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the work of 
researchers attempting to predict human error in repetitive tasks). 
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Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,138 the Hand formula in 
negligence analysis requires weighing several factors and does not require 
specific quantities.139 Instead, it is sufficient for purposes of the formula to find 
that a factor is “higher” or “lower,” “greater” or “lesser.”140 Because one can 
legitimately determine factors with relative language, as shown by Judge Hand’s 
analysis,141 the factors in Comment 18 would be sufficient if an attorney can 
reasonably determine their general content. 
Those attorneys who lack much technological understanding will, however, 
find determining the general content of the factors in the comment difficult due 
to a lack of familiarity. This deficiency in knowledge would inhibit intuitive 
determinations that are easier to form in other areas. For example, an attorney 
may intuitively determine that a copy shop staffed by an inattentive teenager is 
less secure than a bank vault. This same intuitive sense is more difficult for 
attorneys using cloud computing because the attorney-user may lack sufficient 
knowledge to make this type of determination.142 For many people, the ability to 
say that one form of encryption employed by a cloud computing provider is 
comparatively better than another is not as easy as judging the storm-born danger 
of a tethered vessel, as seen in Carroll Towing.143 
Even if there existed a general understanding sufficient to intuitively say 
extra safeguards are needed to prevent disclosure, applying the Comment 18 
factors requires assuming that safeguards exist and that they are deployable. 
Cloud computing providers may not be willing to accommodate a single user 
with requests for additional security as it would require admitting that their 
typical security could be inadequate for customer safety.144 Although the client is 
free to request special levels of heightened or relaxed precautions,145 this does not 
answer what default level of precautions are needed to satisfy the ethically 
imposed “reasonable efforts” without obtaining a client waiver.146 
 
138. 159 F.2d 169 (1947). 
139. Id. at 173 (“[T]he owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is 
a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, 
if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in 
algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B 
is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.”). 
140. Id. (“[T]he likelihood that a barge will break from her fasts and the damage she will do, vary with 
the place and time; for example, if a storm threatens, the danger is greater . . . .”). 
141. Id. 
142. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the intended audience). 
143. 159 F.2d at 173. 
144. Dropbox declares that “[y]our stuff is safe.” Features, DROPBOX, http://www.dropbox.com/features 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
145. MODEL RULE PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) cmt. 18 (2012). 
146. Id. Clients can waive the use of additional safeguards, but this assumes that safeguards exist and that 
they are capable of being used because, otherwise, there is nothing for the client to waive. Id. 
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3. Practical Challenges in Application 
Beyond interpretation issues, attorneys will face difficulty with the 
procedural aspects of applying the test for “reasonable efforts.”147 Compounded 
with the issues in determining the substantive meaning of the factors, the 
provided test for determining reasonable efforts under Model Rule 1.6(c) remains 
unwieldy. 
Factor tests are nothing new. Tort law has the Rowland factors,148 civil 
procedure has the Asahi factors,149 and corporate law has the piercing factors.150 
Rarely will a test have precise rules of application at its inception because these 
doctrines are generally developed over time.151 As common as factor tests are in 
the law, there can be extensive issues in application where there is little 
guidance.152 Here, where attorneys need a clear rule to apply to their practices, the 
lack of guidance for using factors adds to their pre-existing shortcomings.153  
One way to clarify what practices constitute reasonable efforts under Model 
Rule 1.6(c) is judicial or administrative interpretation. Rulings would offer clarity 
on both the proper substantive interpretation of the individual factors as well as 
how to apply them procedurally. There are, however, two problems with this 
wait-and-see approach. First, an interpretation of “reasonable efforts” regarding 
one technology may become outdated by the time it is actually applied due to the 
speed at which technology develops. Second, Model Rule 1.6(c) and Comment 
18 are unlikely to receive enough interpretation to develop a proscriptive scheme 
because the Model Rules are not actual law.154 
It takes time for vague language to develop sound meaning. Justice Cardozo, 
for example, famously confused all with his statement that members of a 
 
147. Id. 
148. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 117 (1968). 
149. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). 
150. See, e.g., DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686–87 (1976) 
(providing a list of factors to use in piercing the corporate veil); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 
1.5 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining and criticizing the various factors used to determine whether to pierce the 
corporate veil). 
151. Compare Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173 (announcing a precise formula for assessing 
negligence), with GEVURTZ, supra note 150, at § 1.5 (asserting that, “despite hundreds of opportunities to get it 
right, judicial opinions in [the area of piercing the corporate veil] have made it one of the most befuddled.”). 
152. Judge Posner in Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r mirrors these applicatory concerns when reviewing 
a similarly vague multifactor test put forward by a lower court. 196 F.3d 833, 835 (1999) (criticizing, at length, 
the use of a “nondirective” test where “[n]o indication is given of how the factors are to be weighed . . . .”). The 
court criticizes the test for using factors that “do not bear a clear relation to either each other or to the primary 
purpose” of the statute at issue and that “because of its nondirective character, [the test] invites the making of 
arbitrary decisions based on uncanalized discretion . . . .” Id. 
153. One is reminded of Justice Scalia’s famous response to the factor test in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. 
Midwesco Enters., Inc., where he disapprovingly declares, “[The Pike balancing test] is more like judging 
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.” 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
154. See Part III.A (discussing the Model Rules). 
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partnership owe each other “[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an 
honor . . . .”155 This statement has been subject to years of scrutiny and only now 
contains an allegedly applicable meaning.156 Comments to the Model Rules are 
unlikely to receive such scrutiny because they “do not add obligations . . . [and 
exist only to] provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules.”157 
Additionally, even though the language of Model Rule 1.6(c) will likely be 
adapted to state ethical codes, technology may outpace any eventual 
interpretation given to these words.158 Waiting for a court to interpret a rule does 
not solve the problem of present-day attorneys who wish to improve their 
practice with cloud computing but are fearful of the seemingly looming ethics 
issues.159 
Ultimately,  the comment factors do not provide an adequate framework for 
determining whether an attorney has made reasonable efforts to prevent access to 
or disclosure of confidential information. Thus, an attorney following the factors 
in Comment 18 will be forced to rely on intuition alone. As a result, the attorney 
might unintentionally act discordantly with respect to the duty of confidentiality 
under Model Rule 1.6(c). This outcome would be completely at odds with the 
Commission’s goals for the rule.160 
4. The Intended Recipients of the Rule 
The intended beneficiaries are important to identify for purposes of Model 
Rule 1.6(c) because it sheds light on how the rule should be interpreted. Model 
Rule 1.0 explains much of the legal terminology used throughout the rules, and 
although it includes definitions of “reasonable,”161 “reasonable belief,”162 and 
“reasonably should know,”163 it does not define the phrase “reasonable efforts.” 
 
155. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928). 
156. Marleen A. O’Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty? Directors’ Conflict-of-Interest 
Transactions and the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954, 966 (1993) 
(“This forceful rhetoric suggests a moral mandate that no fiduciary may attempt to secure any private advantage 
at the expense of the beneficiary. Although some commentators may dismiss the language as mere 
ornamentation, this position fails to account for the way that the Meinhard dictum has endured the test of 
time.”). 
157. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 14 (2012). 
158. Supra Part IV.B.1.  
159. Supra Part II.C.  
160. Supra Part IV.A. 
161. Id. R. 1.0(h) (“‘Reasonable’ or ‘reasonably’ when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the 
conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.”). 
162. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(j) (2012) (“‘Reasonable belief’ or ‘reasonably believes’ 
when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the 
circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.”).    
163. Id. R. 1.0(i) (“‘Reasonably should know’ when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of 
reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.”). 
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If “reasonable efforts” ought to be construed consistently with the use of 
“reasonable,” as a defined term in the Model Rules, then interpreting Model Rule 
1.6(c) would require considering the practices of other “reasonably prudent and 
competent lawyer[s].”164 Alternatively, since the Commission necessarily 
intended the rule to be applicable,165 it is important to understand who the 
Commission intended the rule for when determining whether it meets its goals. 
Either way, because attorneys fall on a wide spectrum of technology competency, 
and because Model Rule 1.6(c) is difficult to apply, some clarity regarding a 
possible solution to the problem may emerge when the intended beneficiaries of 
the rule are identified. 
With regard to attorneys that use technology, there are four basic groups.166 
First, there are those attorneys who adopt new technologies quickly. For these 
attorneys, a higher level of technology competency can be assumed due to 
familiarity and an interest in the area. These attorneys are on the cutting edge of 
technologies and share their discoveries with others. Second, there are those 
attorneys that adopt new technologies but may not quite understand them. This 
might effectively be demonstrated by many of the younger attorneys that are 
facially familiar with numerous aspects of technology. Although comfortable as 
an end-user, these attorneys lack much depth as to how the particular technology 
works or what potential issues may arise. Third, there are those attorneys that use 
technology in their practices but have either no time or no interest in gaining a 
deeper understanding. Last, there are those attorneys that refuse to accept new 
technology in their practices. 
Though not with intention, this last group of attorneys will increasingly 
encounter new technology as it becomes more integrated in the practice of law. 
For example, some courts, including the federal judiciary, use websites for e-
filing and posting of tentative rulings.167 If an attorney actively rejects technology, 
then he is unable to use these services and has increased trouble litigating, 
especially against those attorneys who wholly embrace it.168 Further, attorneys 
 
164. Id. R. 1.0(h).  
165. Supra Part IV.A–B. 
166. The reality is that familiarity and interest with technology falls on a spectrum, and these categories 
are therefore acknowledged to be arbitrary yet still useful for explanatory purposes. 
167. See, e.g., Online Services, THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL. CNTY. OF S.F., http://www.sfsuperior 
court.org/online-services (last visited Jan. 7, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing access 
to court services for civil cases filed in San Francisco County); PACER, http://www.pacer.gov/ (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) 
is an electronic public access service that allows users to obtain case and docket information from federal 
appellate, district and bankruptcy courts . . . .”). 
168. For instance, it would be difficult to effectively communicate with those attorneys that operate 
“virtual private law offices” and almost exclusively do their business online. See supra note 18. It is, of course, 
unlikely that an attorney would reject the Internet entirely because he or she would instead use a staff member 
as a liason. E.g., Thomas, supra note 36 (supposing that “[p]erhaps [the] old guy who never got a computer and 
gets his secretary to print all his emails for him to read has it right after all” after the attorney experienced cloud 
service downtime). 
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may find it hard to avoid cloud computing if it continues to be incorporated into 
the profession similarly to now-standard tools like Internet-based legal 
research.169 
Although ethics rules govern all attorneys, the intended beneficiaries are 
relevant in determining applicability because it can help identify how the 
Commission intended the goals be achieved.170 If the rule was intended for 
attorneys on the end of the spectrum closer to the first category—attorneys who 
adopt new technologies quickly—then the factors would make more sense, 
excusing the other problems, because there is a generally stronger familiarity 
with technology. However, it is more likely that attorneys in categories two or 
three would need a rule guiding their use because they may not understand the 
ramifications of certain actions on confidentiality. If this is the case, then the 
factors do not assist, and the test remains unworkable. 
By explicitly acknowledging the categories of users, a proposal to aid in 
interpreting the language of Model Rule 1.6(c) can be specifically tailored to 
account for those who will likely find trouble in its application. It is likely that 
the attorneys in the first category will know to take necessary precautions 
because they would be more familiar with the threats and risks of error. It also 
seems that the intended beneficiaries of the rule include attorneys who want to 
use or are required to use a particular new technology but do not have a thorough 
understanding of how it works.171 Because these attorneys need not gain an 
insider-level of knowledge about a service they choose to use, nor would they 
have the time, interest, or patience to do so, it is important to ensure the rule 
accounts for this reality while promoting the duty of confidentiality. 
C. Proposal 
The ABA should amend Comment 18 to adequately meet all of the 
Commission’s goals for Model Rule 1.6(c).172 The rule will likely remain relevant 
due to its vague “reasonableness” language,173 but attorneys will have trouble 
applying it to their daily practices. Because this is an ethical rule designed for 
attorneys to apply to their practices in order to clarify and avoid confidentiality 
 
169. See, e.g., Laura K. Justiss, A Survey of Electronic Research Alternatives to LexisNexis and Westlaw 
in Law Firms, 103 LAW LIBR. J. 71 (2011) (discussing a number of digital databases and docket services that 
are used in practice as an alternative to the ever-pervasive Westlaw and Lexis).  
170. See supra Part IV.A (discussing these goals). 
171. For instance, an attorney at a law firm, business, or governmental agency may be forced to use a 
service in his or her practice as a policy for the organization even if the attorney is not interested. Alternatively, 
younger attorneys may have been raised with their fingers on keyboards and thus fail to look both ways before 
crossing the proverbial technology street by forgoing an adequate understanding as to the technologies they use.  
172.  Supra Part IV.A.  
173. Supra Part IV.B.1. 
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breaches, especially when using new technologies like cloud computing, 
attorneys must be able to actually apply the rule. 
1. Determine Reasonable Efforts by Looking to Experts 
The ABA should amend the language of Comment 18 to change the burden 
of determining what technology is safe for use from on the attorney to on experts 
in the particular field. In place of the factor test language, Comment 18 could 
instead read: 
The standard of reasonable efforts required by the rule is met if the level 
of safety and preparation taken to avoid inadvertent or unauthorized 
disclosure is consistent with what a reputable expert in the relevant field 
finds is necessary to sufficiently safeguard confidential information. 
This change allows Model Rule 1.6(c) to accomplish all of the Commission’s 
goals.174 First, by looking to reputable experts in the relevant field, the means of 
interpreting Model Rule 1.6(c) would remain relevant as technology changes. 
Expert knowledge is more likely to be up-to-date on the current trends, and the 
test would not fall subject to the issues associated with specific language 
becoming outdated. 
Second, replacing the factor test in Comment 18 with the proposed language 
would provide a standard that attorneys can actually apply. Looking to experts in 
the field to determine the safety of particular technologies would avoid the 
problem of varied sophistication levels.175 Since there would be no factors to 
weigh, attorneys of all skill levels could apply the test. Additionally, since there 
would be no factor test, the procedural shortcomings would not need to be 
solved.176 For example, an attorney interested in adopting a cloud computing 
service could consult with or research the opinions of qualified computer 
professionals about the security of that encryption type or the reputation of that 
provider. If the service in question is considered secure enough for the needs of 
the attorney by those most familiar with it, then the attorney would be acting 
accordantly with Model Rule 1.6(c) by taking efforts consistent with this better 
understanding of protecting the confidential information.  
One anticipated criticism of this proposal is the difficulty of determining 
what level of knowledge qualifies as reputable. However, reputability could be 
determined through the standards of the particular field. Evidence law has 
grappled with a similar struggle in the admission of scientific evidence through 
the Daubert177 and Frye178 standards. Unlike the more rigid Frye standard, which 
 
174. See supra Part IV.A (discussing these goals). 
175. See supra Part IV.B.4 (discussing the four possible technology sophistication levels of attorneys). 
176. See supra Part IV.B.3 (explaining the procedural challenges). 
177. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 597–98 (1993). 
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requires a “general acceptance” of a scientific theory offered before it is 
admissible in court,179 attorneys using the proposal would invoke a more 
Daubert-like standard, in that reputability stands more as a gatekeeper.  Then, 
whether a particular technology would be on par with what is needed to 
safeguard confidential client information could be understood by comparing it to 
what a reputable expert finds or would find secure, rather than requiring the exact 
technology actually be accepted by the field. 
For example, if an attorney adopted a new, experimental form of data 
storage, an expert might advise additional data back-up to conventional forms of 
storage due to a prevalent attitude that the form of storage in question is less 
stable. If an attorney in this hypothetical followed the expert’s advice regarding 
the prevalent attitudes, then the attorney would have met the ethical duty to take 
reasonable steps to avoid the unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure of 
confidential client information, assuming he or she continues to act accordingly. 
But if the expert advised the attorney that the host of a technology had a history 
of using inadequate measures in areas such as encryption, building security, 
power source stability, or data storage redundancy, then the attorney should 
likely seek an alternative service. 
Of course, the attorney need not necessarily speak to an expert to determine 
whether a particular technology meets the standard. If the attorney is capable, he 
or she could conduct an independent inquiry into expert literature to determine 
what a reputable expert would find as adequate. This proposal does not 
necessitate consulting an expert but rather uses the information gleaned from an 
expert opinion as a basis for determining adequate security and thus reasonable 
efforts. 
 2.  Feasibility and Benefits of the Proposal 
This proposed test would work in conjunction with the Commission’s 
proposed data security guide.180 This guide would serve as a vehicle for sharing 
information regarding particular services as well as providing information on 
data security as the Commission intended.181 Since the Commission wrote Model 
Rule 1.6(c) to clarify the ethical duty and not merely “best practices,” the guide 
currently fails to support the rule. Under this proposal, the guide could serve as a 
central information dispenser regarding meeting the duty as opposed to its 
current enigmatic general role. By not limiting the source of information used to 
 
178. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
179. Id. (“[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”). 
180. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 91, at 5. 
181. Id. (“[T]he Commission has recommended that the ABA create a centralized website that contains 
continuously updated and detailed information about data security.”). 
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determine whether reasonable efforts have been taken, but instead using the 
guide as a possible tool for gathering the information requested by the proposed 
amendment, the ABA would show its dedication to reaching all of the goals of 
Model Rule 1.6(c).182  
Further, moving specific language regarding security out of Comment 18 
reduces the chance that the rule will become outdated and require subsequent 
amendment when new technologies develop that may not comport to the current 
language. This is because the guide can be readily updated to remain consistent 
with expert opinion. 
By positioning the burden of determining whether a particular service is 
adequately secure on the shoulders of experts familiar with the technology, the 
concern regarding varying sophistication level of attorneys is removed.183 
Eliminating the troublesome factor analysis means more attorneys can adopt 
time- and money-saving technologies and find comfort knowing that consulting 
and acting in accordance with experts is sufficient to satisfy this portion of 
confidentiality. Essentially, the attorney would simply conduct a type of due 
diligence on a service to satisfy the requirements of Model Rule 1.6(c). 
This is not the first time in which a Model Rule has looked outside of the text 
for interpretative guidance.184 The previous iteration of Comment 17 in the 2002 
edition of Model Rule 1.6 did not require an attorney to “use special security 
measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of 
privacy” when taking reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure.185 While this 
demonstrates that it is not novel to propose an external means of interpretation, 
problems arose in practice with this example because the language references 
another body of law—the reasonable expectation of privacy—in an area that had 
yet to be fully developed for Internet technologies.186 This proposal avoids this 
issue by referencing a source of information outside of the slower-moving legal 
world as opposed to one reliant on it; the means of determining reasonable efforts 
are instead kept consistent with the continually advancing technology it is 
designed to address through flexible and adaptive language. 
This proposal is feasible because it is a mere amendment to an existing 
comment in the Model Rules. Although the rule and the comment have already 
been officially approved and incorporated into the Model Rules,187 amending a 
 
182. Supra Part IV.A. 
183. Supra Part IV.B.4. 
184. MODEL RULE PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2002). 
185. Id. 
186. See Stephens, supra note 37, at 242–43 (“The answer of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists in a method of communication is not simple. . . . The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of 
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the contents of email.”). 
187. See Ethics 20/20 Rule Changes Approved by ABA Delegates with Little Opposition, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.bna.com/ethics-2020-rule-n12884911245/ (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (announcing the approved changes, including Model Rule 1.6(c)). 
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comment to the Model Rules would be simpler than proposing an entirely new 
rule, which could take years. Further, since it is a relatively minor textual 
alteration that would result in a substantial benefit, the opportunity cost is low. 
Thus, there is a strong incentive to adopt this change. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Attorneys benefit considerably from integrating cloud computing services 
into their practices. Benefits of cloud computing services include decreased cost 
and increased efficiency, but there are real risks posed because of malicious 
attacks and human error.188 Attorneys who want to benefit from incorporating 
cloud computing into their practices should do so consistent with their ethical 
obligations to avoid risks to their client’s confidentiality. 
Model Rule 1.6(c) signals that the profession is interested in promoting the 
use of new technologies like cloud computing. The rule partially exists as 
evidence that the ABA is comfortable with an increasingly technology-reliant 
practice of law.189 The rule itself succeeds in its goal of remaining relevant 
because the reasonableness language in Model Rule 1.6(c) will not need revision 
when the next practice-changing technology arrives.190 On the other hand, one of 
the most important goals of Model Rule 1.6(c)—providing attorneys will a rule 
to ethically guide their conduct—is not achieved in the current iteration.191 With a 
minor change in the interpretive comment to focus on expert guidance in 
determining reasonable efforts, however, the rule would meet all of the ABA’s 
intended goals, giving attorneys a clear and applicable ethical standard that will 
remain relevant over time.192 
 
 
188. See supra Part II.B–D (explaining and evaluating the risks and benefits). 
189. See supra Part IV.A (identifying the goals for the rule, which includes an interest in ethically 
governing use, rather than prohibiting it). 
190. See supra Part IV.B.1 (arguing one benefit of vague “reasonableness” language is prolonged 
relevance through future adaptability). 
191. See supra Part IV.B.2–4 (arguing the issues involved with current means for determining 
“reasonable efforts” under the rule). 
192. See supra Part IV.C .1 (proposing an amendment to the comment interpreting the rule).  
